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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, there is a constructive chaos1 to the conflict-of-
laws process because, for the most part, conflicts rules are judge made.2 
Compounding this common law approach to conflict-of-laws problems, 
“there is no single institution that currently possesses the power to (1) 
determine when uniformity in multistate and multinational transactions is 
desirable, and (2) mandate that uniformity, whether through a single conflict-
of-laws system, uniform substantive rules for multistate and multinational 
transactions, or otherwise.”3 Given the lack of a central conflict-of-laws 
arbiter, there have been many attempts, especially academic ones, at bringing 
Copyright © Donald Earl Childress III 
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. This contribution benefitted from 
presentations and conversations as part of the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law’s 
symposium on “Internationalizing the Conflict Laws Restatement.” My deepest thanks to Professor Ralf 
Michaels and the student editors for their invitation to participate in this symposium. I am especially 
grateful to John Coyle, Bill Dodge, and Linda Silberman for their very helpful suggestions. I also thank 
the student editors for their excellent editing efforts and for their unparalleled logistical support of the 
symposium. 
1. I note that the extent of this chaos, especially in international choice of law, is subject to debate. 
See generally Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 719 (2009).
2. As Professor Symeon Symeonides comprehensively details, there have been some 
movements—most notably in Louisiana and Oregon—to codify by statute conflict-of-laws rules. 
However, U.S. conflicts law is still largely judge-made. See generally SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, 
CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW AROUND THE WORLD (2014). 
3. Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International and 
Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 580 (2002). 
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order to the chaos.4 Chief among them are the Restatement projects offered 
by the American Law Institute. 
A brief history of this dialogic process is as follows: conflict-of-laws 
rules are identified and (re)stated; conflicts rules beget judicial exceptions; 
judicial exceptions engender criticism; criticism produces 
reconceptualization; reconceptualization begets a new attempt to bring order 
to conflicts chaos through the identification and restatement of new 
standards and rules.5 We now arrive at the Restatement (Third) of the Law of 
Conflict of Laws, where this process will now play out in this generation. 
As Professor Kermit Roosevelt, the Reporter for the new Conflicts 
Restatement, explained in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
Online, the new Conflicts Restatement will take data compiled from the 
experience of U.S. courts with conflict-of-laws methods, especially the 
Second Conflicts Restatement, and “create a new set of rules that 
incorporates the relevant factors in a way that gives precise guidance [to 
courts] in particular cases.”6 According to Professor Roosevelt, a process that 
“began with the overthrow of arbitrary rules should end with better rules.”7 
As part of this process, the new Conflicts Restatement details that a U.S. 
court confronted with a conflict-of-laws problem should perform two steps. 
First, the court must determine the scope of the law or laws that may be 
applicable.8 Second, it must then decide how to resolve conflicts uncovered 
by the first step.9 The second step is a question of which law should take 
“priority” in the event of a conflict.10 Presumably, the first step will alleviate 
the need for a choice between competing laws in most cases because the 
scope question will identify the law that should be applied by a court in a 
given case. As such, the appropriate law will be identified and the more 
weighty approach of choosing the applicable law—the priority question—
 
 4.  Since the publication in 1834 of Justice Joseph Story’s seminal Commentaries on the Conflict 
of Laws, various approaches have been offered. See generally Kurt H. Nadelmann, Joseph Story’s 
Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 230 (1961). 
 5.  This is basically the process that led to the First Restatement’s “vested rights” approach and 
later led to the abandonment and substitution of that approach by the Second Restatement, which proposed 
the “most significant relationship” approach. 
 6.  Kermit Roosevelt III, Response, Legal Realism and the Conflict of Laws, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 325, 329 (2015), https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/163-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-325.pdf. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.01 cmt. b(3) (AM. LAW. INST., 
Preliminary Draft No. 2, Aug. 12, 2016) (“The forum must determine which states’ laws include the 
transaction or event within their scope, and which laws shall be given priority if conflicts exist.”).  
 9.  See id. (“[The choice-of-law rules] identify the laws that might create such rights or relations 
and choose, when necessary, among competing laws.”). 
 10.  Id. (“Each state has its own rules about how to determine the scope of states’ laws and how to 
assign priority in conflicts between laws.”). 
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will be necessary only in the most difficult cases. The new Conflicts 
Restatement thus adopts Professor Brainerd Currie’s view that the conflict-
of-laws process is akin to garden variety statutory construction and 
interpretation.11 
The new Conflicts Restatement explains that interstate and international 
conflicts are “broadly similar,”12 and, presumably, the scope/priority 
analysis will apply to international conflicts cases just as it would to domestic 
conflicts cases. One wonders, however, whether general principles of 
statutory construction developed in the context of U.S. domestic law, where 
the distribution of legislative and adjudicatory power between the several 
states is paramount—a federalism concern—should be transplanted to cases 
with transnational elements, where the distribution of power between the 
United States and other nations is implicated—a foreign affairs concern. We 
are thus left to ask: Should the new Conflicts Restatement treat transnational 
cases differently? 
Even if many, if not most, conflicts cases can be resolved by the 
question of a relevant law’s scope, what happens when there is a priority 
question, especially in a transnational case? How is a U.S. court to choose 
the applicable law when either domestic or foreign law could be applied? 
What standards or rules should guide a court in transnational cases? More 
so, is international law relevant to this analysis? 
This contribution to a symposium on internationalizing the new 
Conflicts Restatement examines the impact that transnational cases have had 
on judicial decisions in the United States, and how the resolution of these 
cases by U.S. courts may be helpful to the drafters of the new Conflicts 
Restatement. We begin with the observation that recent transnational cases, 
regardless of whether they are treated separately by the new Conflicts 
Restatement, offer important insights into the current and evolving conflict-
of-laws process in the United States. These cases also offer insight into the 
ways in which the new Conflicts Restatement’s focus on scope and priority 
should be developed. Part I explores how the presumption against 
extraterritoriality relates to the new Conflicts Restatement’s concern with 
scope and priority. Part II considers whether the new Conflicts Restatement 
should consider larger, regulatory conflicts in the transnational arena, and, if 
so, how to deal with them, especially in the context of the priority question. 
This contribution concludes with some points for further study that should 
be examined by the new Conflicts Restatement. 
 
 11.  BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 627 (1963). 
 12.  RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.04 cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST., 
Proposed Draft No. 2, Aug. 12, 2016). 
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I. PRESUMPTIONS, SCOPE, AND PRIORITY 
International conflict of laws is subject to two basic methodological 
approaches in the United States, depending on whether federal law or state 
law is at issue. U.S. courts ordinarily use the presumption against 
extraterritoriality when federal law potentially applies and conflict-of-laws 
rules when tort, contract, property, and other areas of private law are 
potentially applicable.13 Both approaches should be considered in drafting 
the new Conflicts Restatement, for they point to different methods that U.S. 
courts use to deal with questions of scope and priority, especially in 
transnational cases. Surprisingly, they also point to a convergence in 
approach whereby U.S. courts avoid conflicts questions altogether through 
scope determinations. 
Federal Law. The presumption against extraterritoriality approach 
applies in transnational cases brought under federal law. Under this 
approach, “[w]here a federal statute is involved . . . a choice of law analysis 
does not apply in the first instance. The initial question, rather, is whether 
Congress intended the statute in question to apply to conduct occurring 
outside the United States.”14 In determining congressional intent, the only 
question is one “of statutory interpretation . . . not a question of choice of 
law.”15 
Understanding the presumption against extraterritoriality from a 
conflict-of-laws perspective may illuminate the new Conflicts Restatement’s 
concern with scope in the conflict-of-laws process. This is so because 
conflict-of-laws rules arguably serve the same goals as the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. As a matter of policy, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, “serves to avoid the international discord that can result 
when U.S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries” and “also reflects 
the more prosaic commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates 
with domestic concerns in mind.”16 Likewise, the “most important function” 
of conflict-of-laws rules “is to make the interstate and international systems 
work well,” and reflect that in practice “[l]egislatures usually legislate, and 
courts usually adjudicate, only with the local situation in mind.”17 
 
 13.  DONALD EARL CHILDRESS III, MICHAEL D. RAMSEY & CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK, 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 6 (2015). 
 14.  Liquidation Comm’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1351 (11th Cir. 
2008) (quoting Orion Tire Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 268 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15.  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 16.  RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 17.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmts. c, d. 
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Federal extraterritoriality analysis is subject to a two-step framework. 
When determining whether a federal statute18 applies extraterritorially, the 
first step is to ask “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication 
that it applies extraterritorially.”19 As will be discussed shortly, the federal 
extraterritoriality approach is basically an analysis of the scope of federal 
law. Questions of priority are only obliquely hinted at by the Supreme Court 
and lower federal courts.20 This may be because the presumption against 
extraterritoriality developed in the context of public law.21 Since foreign law 
would not be applied because it was public law—the so-called “public law 
taboo”22—the only question before a U.S. court is whether the federal statute 
applies. However, I am unaware of any U.S. court recognizing this explicitly 
for avoidance of the priority question when applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. Either there is no priority analysis when courts employ the 
presumption against extraterritoriality because foreign law cannot be 
applicable, or U.S. courts are combining the scope and priority steps in one 
approach through the presumption. 
If the first step confirms that the federal statute applies extraterritorially, 
then the inquiry ends there and the statute applies. If the answer is in the 
negative, then the federal claim must be dismissed unless it involves a 
domestic application of the federal statute. A U.S. court is to determine 
whether a domestic application is at issue “by looking to the statute’s 
‘focus.’”23 As the Supreme Court has explained: 
If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States, 
then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other 
conduct occurred abroad; but if the relevant conduct occurred in a foreign 
country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial 
 
 18.  In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court held that although the presumption 
“typically” applies to federal statutory interpretation, “the principles underlying the canon of 
interpretation similarly constrain courts” recognizing federal common-law causes of action. 133 S. Ct. 
1659, 1664 (2013). 
 19.  RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
 20.  I take it, however, that the drafters of the new Conflicts Restatement suppose that analyzing 
questions of scope involves more than just examining domestic law but also requires an analysis of the 
scope, and thus potential applicability, of foreign law. The hope, one presumes, is that a U.S. court’s 
focus on scope will uncover many “false conflicts” and enable the application of only one law, domestic 
or foreign. The new Conflicts Restatement thus treats the scope question as a filter to avoid questions of 
priority. 
 21.  I thank Professor Linda Silberman for this observation. For a general explanation of the “public-
private” distinction, see William S. Dodge, The Public-Private Distinction in the Conflict of Laws, 18 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 371 (2008). 
 22.  See generally William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161 
(2002). 
 23.  RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
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application regardless of whether other conduct occurred in U.S. 
territory.24 
Courts however, must be wary in concluding too quickly that some 
minimal domestic conduct means that the statute could be applied 
domestically: “[I]t is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that 
lacks all contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption 
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it 
retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the 
case.”25 
One might presume that this two-step framework is relatively 
straightforward. It is anything but. Indeed, this presumption of the domestic 
scope of U.S. federal law does not limit the potential applicability of federal 
law to foreign conduct. Foreign conduct that produces some effect in the 
United States might be swept within the “focus” of a federal statute. 
Furthermore, domestic conduct that produces effects in foreign jurisdictions 
may also be subject to a federal statute. It depends on what the “focus” of a 
statute is, which itself can be open to debate. While the focus inquiry is still 
early in its U.S. legal development, some courts have concluded that the 
inquiry turns on the location of the wrong for which Congress sought to 
impose liability.26 
In cases following the Supreme Court’s RJR Nabisco decision, which 
held that a private RICO plaintiff must allege and prove a domestic injury to 
its business or property to be within the RICO statute’s focus,27 courts have 
held that it is the location “where the injury itself arose” and not the location 
of the “purportedly injurious conduct” that controls the question of scope.28 
U.S. courts may in fact be adopting a lex loci delicti rule on the question of 
focus that will limit the applicability of federal law to foreign harms. Under 
 
 24.  Id. at 2094.  
 25.  Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010). 
 26.  See, e.g., Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 660 (4th Cir. 2016) (inquiry under the Alien Tort Statute 
turns on the location of the conduct alleged to violate international law); Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 
576, 592, 593 (11th Cir. 2015) (same), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1168 (2016); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 
770 F.3d 170, 184 (2d Cir. 2014) (same). But see Absolute Activist Value Master Fund, Inc. v. Ficeto, 
677 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2012) (illustrating that location of the conduct is irrelevant by holding that “rather 
than looking to the identity of the parties, the type of security at issue, or whether each individual 
defendant engaged in conduct within the United States, we hold that a securities transaction is domestic 
when the parties incur irrevocable liability to carry out the transaction within the United States or when 
title is passed within the United States”). 
 27.  RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106 (“A private RICO plaintiff therefore must allege and prove a 
domestic injury to its business or property.”). 
 28.  City of Almaty, Kazakhstan v. Ablyazov, 15–CV–5345 (AJN), 2016 WL 7756629, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2016). 
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this view, unless the place of injury is in the United States, federal law is not 
applicable at all. 
We have thus far discussed only the scope question. The Supreme 
Court’s focus inquiry may also be relevant to questions of priority. Perhaps 
in cases where the harms complained of were within the focus of a federal 
statute then a secondary, priority analysis would be undertaken. However, I 
am unaware of court decisions adopting such an approach. Rather, the focus 
inquiry is a secondary attempt at statutory construction, as opposed to a 
priority analysis. As such, the focus inquiry does not seek to weigh the 
priority of laws that may compete for application. Again, this may be because 
of the “public law taboo.”29 If a court determines either (1) that federal law 
is extraterritorial or (2) that the harms complained of fall within the “focus” 
of a statute, then federal law is applied barring some other limitation. 
Importantly, questions of “focus” are only relevant to interpreting the 
domestic scope of federal law.30 The focus of a statute is not relevant to the 
first step, whether the statute applies extraterritorially (the foreign scope 
question). There remains uncertainty, therefore, in the first step whether 
there are other limitations that limit the applicability of U.S. federal law 
which, by its terms, has extraterritorial effect. 
In RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court observed that if a statute does apply 
extraterritorially, “we would not need to determine which [foreign conduct] 
it applied to; it would apply to all [foreign conduct] (barring some other 
limitation).”31 The Court has been silent as to what these other limitations 
might be. The Court may have been offering a nod to the Charming Betsy 
canon—a presumption that Congress does not legislate beyond what is 
permitted by international law.32 The Court may also have been 
acknowledging doctrines such as personal jurisdiction, forum non 
conveniens, international comity, or other doctrines limiting the application 
of U.S. federal law.33 To be sure, the Supreme Court’s parenthetical leaves 
much undetermined. 
The new Conflicts Restatement can learn much from the recent 
experience of U.S. federal courts in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
renewed interest in the presumption against extraterritoriality as applied in 
transnational cases. Chief among the difficult questions facing the new 
 
 29.  I thank Professor Bill Dodge and Professor Linda Silberman for this observation. See generally 
Dodge, supra note 22. 
 30.  RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
 31.  Id. at 2101–02 (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267 n.9) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 32.  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814–15 (1993). 
 33.  See generally Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational Cases: The 
Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015). 
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Conflicts Restatement is whether a federal law that is extraterritorial may still 
be limited by other doctrines, especially international law doctrines. 
Furthermore, identifying factors that should guide courts’ focus analyses 
would help clarify the extent of the new Conflicts Restatement’s inquiries 
into scope and priority. At a minimum, careful analysis by the drafters will 
offer insight into what “other limitations” might constrain the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. federal law. 
These unanswered questions of scope and priority in the context of 
federal law provide fruitful investigative opportunities for the new Conflicts 
Restatement. 
State Law. The above two-step approach is the standard method for 
determining the scope of federal law. But, what of the extraterritorial scope 
of state statutory and common law (a question of state law that the federal 
presumption does not automatically apply to)? 
While most courts applying state law rely on conflict-of-laws 
methodologies to resolve questions concerning the extraterritorial 
application of state law, some courts—especially in transnational cases 
involving the interpretation of state statutory law—also apply a presumption 
against the extraterritoriality of state law. This state law application of the 
extraterritoriality presumption, as in the case of the federal presumption, may 
obviate the need for a conflict-of-laws analysis. Courts applying state law 
are thus developing a scope-like inquiry that the new Conflicts Restatement 
would do well to consider. In short, the new Conflicts Restatement should 
not assume that conflict-of-laws methods are the only ways that state courts 
and federal courts applying state law are dealing with conflicts in 
transnational cases. Courts may also be using a presumption against the 
extraterritoriality of state law. 
In California, for instance, state statutory laws are presumed not to 
apply outside of California “unless such intention is clearly expressed or 
reasonably to be inferred from the language of the act or from its purpose, 
subject matter or history.”34 This is a strong presumption that applies even 
when there is a contractual choice-of-law provision that selects California 
law.35 Nevertheless, California statutory remedies “may be available to non-
California residents if those persons are harmed by wrongful conduct 
 
 34.  Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 19 Cal. 4th 1036, 1059 (1999) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
 35.  See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“[A] contractual 
choice of law provision that incorporates California law presumably incorporates all of California law—
including California’s presumption against extraterritorial application of its law.”); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 
60 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Even if the choice of law provision were intended to confer 
upon out-of-state drivers a cause of action for violation of California’s wage and hour laws, it could not 
do so. An employee cannot create by contract a cause of action that California law does not provide.”). 
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occurring in California.”36 In determining whether wrongful conduct 
occurred in California, courts consider factors such as where the defendant 
conducts business, whether the defendant’s principal offices are located in 
California, where the plaintiff is located, and where the alleged actionable 
conduct took place.37 California appears to have basically developed its own 
version of the federal presumption’s two-step framework for 
extraterritoriality questions. California’s presumption may be “a craven 
watchdog”38 in light of these factors that permit the application of California 
state law.39 
While some states, like California, have adopted a presumption against 
extraterritoriality,40 other states have remained silent on extraterritoriality. 
For instance, some state courts apply the presumption against 
extraterritoriality through the backdoor by limiting the scope of state law by 
reference to federal counterpart law, such as securities or antitrust law.41 
While there may be a certain level of convergence among the federal and 
state approaches, at least one state supreme court has recognized but applied 
a more limited view of the presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of state law, thus permitting the application of a state tort claims 
act to torts committed outside of the state, including in foreign countries.42 
One state supreme court has held that because the state statute applied to 
claims “outside of Iowa” the presumption was rebutted.43 Furthermore, the 
metes and bounds of the presumption against the extraterritoriality of state 
law are even less clear with regards to  the scope of state common law.44 
Recent case law suggests that there may be some level of convergence 
between federal and state law and that both federal and state courts will apply 
a presumption against extraterritoriality to statutory and common law claims. 
This focus on scope will limit the potential for a conflict-of-laws analysis. 
The only question before the courts is whether federal or state law applies as 
a matter of statutory construction and not whether another law competes for 
 
 36.  In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 916 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 37.  Id. at 917. 
 38.  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266. 
 39.  Many examples exist of California explicitly seeking to apply its law extraterritorially. See, 
e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(b) (“[T]he following chapters and sections of this division shall apply to 
a foreign corporation . . . .”). California’s restraint in this area may thus be illusory in many contexts. I 
thank Professor John Coyle for this observation. 
 40.  Besides California, other states that utilize the presumption include Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, New York, Texas, and Utah.  
 41.  See, e.g., Glob. Reinsurance Corp. v. Equitas Ltd., 969 N.E.2d 187, 195 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2012). 
 42.  Griffen v. State, 767 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Iowa 2009). 
 43.  Id. at 637. 
 44.  See generally, e.g., Jeffrey A. Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law: Does the Common Law 
Apply Abroad?, 102 GEO. L.J. 301 (2014). 
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application—a priority question. I note that while many cases subject to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality will be dismissed as impermissible 
extraterritorial applications of a federal or state law, many cases will still be 
subject to applicable U.S. law when they fall within the focus of the statute 
or involve acts or effects in the forum state. Whether courts will next 
undertake a priority analysis is an open question. This question should be 
addressed by the new Conflicts Restatement. 
All of this is to say that conflict-of-laws methodology in the United 
States may be taking on a slightly different approach than that detailed in 
earlier conflicts Restatements. It remains possible that a more developed 
approach to the presumption against the extraterritoriality of state law in state 
courts could limit the need for conflict-of-laws analyses entirely. To the 
extent the federal law of extraterritoriality is adopted by courts applying state 
law, either federal courts sitting in diversity or state courts, there will be an 
impact on conflict-of-laws methods generally. In particular, questions of 
priority may be resolved by a focus analysis grounded in an extraterritoriality 
analysis that only takes account of domestic law. 
At bottom, doctrines developed in the context of transnational cases are 
perhaps changing domestic conflict-of-laws methods, particularly in the 
context of the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, both federal and state. 
This insight fits within the conceptual framework of the new Conflicts 
Restatement’s concern with scope, but a more nuanced accounting of how 
the scope and priority inquiries are playing out in federal and state law—
especially in transnational cases—is necessary. 
Priority. At present, the drafters have remained relatively silent as to 
how the priority prong of the new Conflicts Restatement’s analysis will work 
in domestic or transnational cases. Let me begin with an observation. As 
illustrated in the previous sections, U.S. courts do their very best to minimize 
conflicts and avoid dealing directly with questions of priority. This is so 
because courts continue, notwithstanding academic commentary, to operate 
under traditional notions of territoriality. Courts tend to focus on whether 
domestic legislative jurisdiction requires the application of domestic law to 
foreign facts and spend very little time considering foreign law.45 Courts also 
spend little time analyzing the priority question between domestic and 
foreign law. 
Even when there is a conflict recognized by a court, thus encouraging 
recourse to the conflict-of-laws process, that process itself seeks to diminish 
conflicts. Of course, we have come a long way since Professor Joseph Beale 
 
 45.  See Donald Earl Childress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization: The Case of Transnational 
Personal Jurisdiction, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1493 (2013) (“[T]here is little empirical evidence 
that courts extensively cite foreign law.”). 
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claimed in the First Restatement that laws never compete for application and 
that the question for a court is only to determine the appropriate jurisdiction 
whose laws control the case.46 Modern choice of law theories, however, do 
no better in embracing conflicts. Professor Brainerd Currie sought to 
minimize conflicts through his “governmental interest analysis” and resisted 
the ability of courts to resolve actual conflicts until late in his career when 
he moderated his position.47 Similarly, the Second Restatement offers very 
little guidance in analyzing actual conflicts of law. One hopes that the new 
Conflicts Restatement will avoid falling into a similar trap, especially in 
transnational cases. 
In many cases, U.S. courts are willing to assume that there is no conflict 
between foreign and domestic law, and thus that the court can apply domestic 
law—that is, U.S. federal or state law—to a foreign occurrence. And, even 
in cases where there is a conflict, the trend of U.S. case law is to dismiss the 
case on forum non conveniens or other grounds on account of the 
comparative difficulties incident to a U.S. court applying foreign law.48 
In light of the above state of affairs, what does this signal about the role 
of U.S. courts as they go about negotiating the priority question, especially 
in transnational cases? And what should it tell the drafters of the new 
Conflicts Restatement? These questions submit to no easy answer. One 
hopes, however, that the drafters of the new Conflicts Restatement will 
account for them in their drafting process. If the priority question really 
matters, courts need concrete analytical guidelines. 
The lack of a clear method for negotiating conflicts, which is a priority 
question, perhaps encourages courts to resist conflicts. Furthermore, in the 
United States legal questions are more often being resolved at the procedural 
level, especially in transnational cases, and procedural resolution does not 
invite analysis of foreign law. Even when cases survive procedural 
questions, many substantive questions are resolved by invoking legal 
formulae designed to resist applying foreign law. 
The question for the new Conflicts Restatement is whether 
consideration of a court’s usage of these doctrines will bear insights for the 
 
 46.  William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial 
Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 111–13 (1998). 
 47.  Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Brainerd Currie’s Interest Analysis, in COLLECTED COURSES OF 
THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 68–
71 (Academie de Droit International de la Haye ed., 1989).  
 48.  See Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient Forum in 
Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 157, 168–72, 167–68 (2012) (discussing recent empirical studies 
on the prevalence of forum non conveniens motions, and noting, with concern, that “[t]he upshot of this 
case law is that a court is vested with wide discretion to dismiss a case with foreign elements, especially 
where a foreign plaintiff and foreign law is involved”). 
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proposed priority analysis. More work must be done by the drafters in 
examining foreign law conflicts of priority and offering standards for the 
resolution of such conflicts. 
II. BIG CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL COMITY 
One might say that cases involving the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law are markedly different than the bread-and-butter cases that courts, 
especially U.S. state courts, routinely confront in conflict-of-laws matters, 
where the legal question is typically whether the law of one U.S. state or 
another should be applied. The question is whether the new Conflicts 
Restatement should consider “big conflicts” as well as “little” ones.49 
This is an observation made recently by Professor Katherine Florey.50 
She explains that conflict-of-laws doctrine today “present[s] two distinct 
faces.”51 The first face, which she argues encapsulates garden-variety tort 
and contract cases, produces uncontroversial results in relatively simple 
cases. These are, in her terms, “little conflicts.”52 Other conflicts, which she 
terms “big conflicts,” present tough issues when a court is asked to favor one 
state’s policy over another.53 These conflicts arise most often in international 
conflict-of-laws cases. These cases present, among other things, regulatory 
choices as to which state’s law, domestic or foreign, can operate, and the 
courts ultimately determine which state’s policies will be pursued.54 
Professor Florey’s observations are, I believe, very helpful to the 
drafters of the new Conflicts Restatement. Even if we assume that the scope 
and priority analyses identified by the present draft can be applied 
serviceably by U.S. courts in both interstate and international cases, it is not 
clear how this approach should be used to resolve larger, cross-border 
regulatory and other international conflicts. Indeed, the new Conflicts 
Restatement may wish to give consideration to the fact that foreign 
sovereigns are nowadays frequently involved in U.S. litigation. 
It would be useful for the new Restatement to consider one doctrine 
where U.S. courts appear to take account of questions of priority and foreign 
sovereign submissions: international comity. 
 
 49.  These terms come from Katherine Florey, Big Conflicts Little Conflicts, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683 
(2015). 
 50.  Id. at 683. 
 51.  Id. at 685. 
 52.  See id. at 687 (noting the “relatively smooth resolution of conflicts problems in small-scale 
cases”). 
 53.  Id. at 689–90.  
 54.  Id. at 690. 
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It is generally recognized under international law that courts are bound 
to apply the “norms of the national legal order only” as represented by “the 
law of the state whose organs they are.”55 Courts in the United States, 
however, will apply the norms of other legal systems, be they foreign law or 
judgments. The dictates of comity, or a respectful consideration of the 
foreign forum, its law, and its legal judgments, has long been recognized as 
the most appropriate way for U.S. courts to resolve conflicts in private law 
between juridical systems.56 
While a precise definition of comity remains “elusive,”57 it has been 
explained as “the most appropriate phrase to express the true foundation and 
extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation within the territories of 
another.”58 Comity thus serves as a legal justification for the resolution of 
conflict-of-laws problems—namely, the laws of one country and their 
judgments may be applied by a court in another country by virtue of 
comity.59 International comity has also been described by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in its most-cited case on the subject, Hilton v. Guyot, as “the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or 
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”60 Comity here 
serves as a judicial canon (as recognition) encouraging a court’s deference 
to a foreign sovereign—namely, a court is empowered to balance various 
public, private, and international factors when determining if comity is due 
in cases involving legislative, executive, and judicial proclamations. As 
 
 55.  HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 254 (1952). 
 56.  See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as 
Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 30 (2010) (“The Supreme Court expressly adopted Story’s 
views [on comity] . . . in 1839 and has applied the doctrine, as have the lower federal courts, in various 
forms ever since.”). For a comprehensive treatment of the various instances of international comity in 
U.S. case law, see generally William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2071 (2015). 
 57.  See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (describing comity as “a complex and elusive concept”); JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos 
de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The doctrine has never been well-defined, 
leading one scholar to pronounce it ‘an amorphous never-never land whose borders are marked by fuzzy 
lines of politics, courtesy, and good faith.’”) (quoting Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a 
Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281 
(1982)). 
 58.  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 38 (1865).  
 59.  See, e.g., Hessel N. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9, 12 (1966) (detailing 
the evolution of the comity doctrine and describing comity as “a rational basis for choice of law among 
competing local customs or municipal enactments according to the nature of the case”). Such invocations 
of the comity doctrine are largely directed at questions of private law—that is, questions of whether 
foreign contract, tort, or property law should be applied in a domestic forum. 
 60.  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). 
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such, U.S. courts frequently apply the law or judgment of a foreign court in 
the interest of comity. 
In the United States, respectful consideration of foreign governments 
and their laws generally counsels in favor of application of foreign law and 
enforcement of foreign judgments through comity. To the extent the public 
policy exception might be used to resist application of enforcement, its use 
has been generally limited. When it has been used, U.S. courts tend to focus 
on the international and domestic issues at stake, although not clearly. In 
fact, to the extent that there is any discussion at all, the concern is mostly 
with the domestic interests at stake in the case at hand. As such, the lower 
federal courts and the courts of the several states have been left to their own 
devices in developing these doctrines. Here again, the new Conflicts 
Restatement has a comparative advantage in precisely identifying the 
contours of this doctrine. 
What is perhaps more interesting is the fact that for all the ink spilled 
regarding increased internationalization and comparative constitutionalism 
in the United States, there is very little real evidence that the U.S. Supreme 
Court, or the U.S. judiciary generally, has gone international or 
transnational.61 Indeed, the comity analysis in the United States is perhaps 
forum-centric, just like many U.S. conflict-of-laws methods. The new 
Conflicts Restatement should rise to the challenge to consider the 
opportunities that international comity presents. A recent case serves as a 
cautionary tale. 
In 2003, a group of residents of Santo Domingo, Colombia, brought suit 
against Occidental Petroleum Corporation (“Occidental”) and Airscan, Inc. 
(“Airscan”) in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California for harms incurred in a 1998 bombing in Santo Domingo. The 
bombing was allegedly conducted by the Colombian Air Force.62 Occidental, 
as part of a joint venture with the Colombian government, operated an oil 
pipeline and facility in Colombia.63 Airscan provided security for the 
pipeline and facility.64 The plaintiffs alleged that the bombing was carried 
out by the Colombian Air Force in the course of defending the pipeline from 
insurgent attacks. They also alleged that Occidental and Airscan conspired 
 
 61.  Roger P. Alford, Lower Courts and Constitutional Comparativism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 
647 (2008) (“Despite extensive analysis, there is one aspect of this subject that has been almost 
completely ignored by scholars: the reception or lack thereof, of constitutional comparativism by state 
and lower federal courts.”). 
 62.  Mujica v. Airscan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 63.  Id. at 584–85. 
 64.  Id. at 585. 
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and worked in tandem with the Colombian military to carry out the attack.65 
The plaintiffs brought claims under the Alien Tort Statute, the Torture 
Victims Protection Act, and claims under state law for wrongful death, 
infliction of emotional distress, and unfair business practices.66 
On February 3, 2004, before the filing of the answer or any dispositive 
motion, the federal district court solicited the views of the Department of 
State. After initially declining to take a position, the United States filed a 
statement of interest in December 2004 urging dismissal on account of 
foreign policy and practical problems with “U.S. courts second-guessing the 
actions of the Colombian government and its military officials.”67 The 
district court permitted the federal claims to go forward, but dismissed the 
state law claims on grounds of foreign affairs preemption. The court also 
found all the claims non-justiciable under the political question doctrine. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
dismissed the federal claims. After concluding that a true conflict is not 
always required to apply the international comity doctrine, the Ninth Circuit 
offered a set of factors to guide its analysis of the state law claims. These 
factors are (1) the United States’ interest in the case, (2) the foreign 
government’s interest in the case, and (3) the adequacy of the alternative 
forum. Having determined that a true conflict is not required for the 
application of adjudicatory comity and that the district court abused its 
discretion in concluding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit proceeded to consider 
the proper framework for analyzing whether the state law claims could 
proceed in light of international comity. 
Relying on international law, the Ninth Circuit noted that: 
[t]he (nonexclusive) factors we should consider when assessing U.S. 
interests include (1) the location of the conduct in question, (2) the 
nationality of the parties, (3) the character of the conduct in question, (4) 
the foreign policy interests of the United States, and (5) any public policy 
interests. When some or all of a plaintiff’s claims arise under state law, the 
state’s interests, if any, should be considered as well.68 
The court went on to note that “[t]he proper analysis of foreign interests 
essentially mirrors the consideration of U.S. interests. Foreign states, no less 
than the United States, have legitimate interests in regulating conduct that 
occurs within their borders, involves their nationals, impacts their public and 
 
 65.  Id. at 591. 
 66.  Id. at 586. 
 67.  Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 6, Mujica v. Airscan Inc., 
771 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 10–55515, 10–55516, 10–55587) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 68.  Id. at 604. 
CHILDRESS - FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2017  4:45 PM 
376 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 27:361 
foreign policies, and implicates universal norms.”69 And finally, these 
interests were to be evaluated in light of the adequacy of the foreign forum. 
Finding that the U.S. interest was slight, the Ninth Circuit dismissed that 
state law claims. 
What is striking about the Ninth Circuit’s decision is that the court 
undertook this comity analysis without first conducting a conflict-of-laws 
analysis. California’s conflict-of-laws method, like the comity test 
announced by the court, is based on the relative interests of the governments 
involved in application of their law to the dispute—a priority question. The 
state where the challenged conduct occurred holds a “predominant” interest 
in regulating conduct within its borders. In contrast, the state in which the 
defendant resides, here California, holds a weak interest (at best) in the 
application of its law. So, Colombian law presumably would govern and 
would have barred recovery. As such, the Ninth Circuit needed to go no 
further than California’s conflict-of-laws rules to dismiss the case. 
Yet, neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit undertook a formal 
conflict-of-laws analysis. And, as noted above, the Ninth Circuit went out of 
its way to avoid conflict-of-laws methods, and indeed the direct invocation 
of international law, through the invocation of the international comity 
doctrine. It also did not inquire into the scope of California’s law. The court 
bypassed the scope question and went right to priority. But, its priority 
analysis did not find that a U.S. court should apply foreign law. The court 
held that the case should be dismissed. 
The most notable question facing courts is whether they should view 
their role and the application of the comity doctrine as domestic or 
international. Should they be charged with ascertaining whether certain 
foreign normative commitments should be respected, accommodated, or 
preempted based on an evaluation of the differences between the domestic 
forum’s policies and those of the foreign forum? Or should the role of the 
courts be to develop international rules to negotiate these differences that 
give respect not only to domestic legal interests but also those of the 
international legal system writ large? 
The question for the new Conflicts Restatement is whether this 
international comity analysis can be used as part of the conflict-of-laws 
analysis to guide courts, especially in resolving priority questions and in 
transnational cases. 
Let’s consider another recent case to test these boundaries. In late 2016, 
the Second Circuit reversed a jury verdict of $147 million after trebling and 
dismissed antitrust claims against a Chinese manufacturer of vitamin C, 
 
 69.  Id. at 607. 
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ruling that the case should have been dismissed by the district court on a 
motion to dismiss, filed just over ten years earlier.70 The district court 
permitted China’s Ministry of Commerce (the “Ministry” or “MOFCOM”) 
to participate in the case as an amicus curiae but refused to credit the 
Ministry’s interpretation of Chinese law. Holding that the district court’s 
refusal to defer to the Chinese government was reversible error, the Second 
Circuit recognized that when “we receive from a foreign government an 
official statement explicating its own laws and regulations, we are bound to 
extend that explication the deference long accorded such proffers received 
from foreign governments.”71 
The plaintiffs sued four vitamin C manufacturers, and an affiliate of one 
of them, based in the People’s Republic of China, alleging they violated the 
Sherman Antitrust Act by entering into a cartel organized by the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce (the “Chamber”) to fix the prices and amount of 
vitamin C exported to the United States. The defendants moved to dismiss 
the complaint on the grounds of comity, the Act of State doctrine and the 
doctrine of foreign sovereign compulsion. The motion to dismiss was 
supported by an amicus brief submitted on MOFCOM’s behalf. In it, “[t]he 
Ministry explained that the Chamber, which Plaintiffs refer to as an 
‘association,’ is entirely unlike a ‘trade association’ or the ‘chamber of 
commerce’ in the United States and, consistent with China’s state-run 
economy, is a ‘Ministry-supervised entity authorized . . . to regulate vitamin 
C export prices and output levels.’”72 The Ministry’s amicus brief explained 
that the export prices and output levels alleged as unlawful by the plaintiffs 
were actually the result of a consensus on price and output reached by the 
manufacturers under direct instructions from MOFCOM through the 
Chamber. However, unwilling to defer to the Chinese government’s 
explanation of its own laws and regulations, the district court denied the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss. Similar arguments, supported by similar 
amicus statements proffered by the Ministry, were offered in support of 
subsequent motions for summary judgment and interlocutory appeal, both of 
which were denied. The remaining manufacturer defendant and its affiliate 
appealed that verdict. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal 
below. According to the Second Circuit, 
[T]he district court abused its discretion by not abstaining, on international 
comity grounds, from asserting jurisdiction because the court erred by 
concluding that the Chinese law did not require Defendants to violate U.S. 
 
 70.  In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 71.  Id. at 179. 
 72.  Id. at 180. 
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antitrust law and further erred by not extending adequate deference to the 
Chinese government’s proffer of the interpretation of its laws.73 
The Second Circuit relied on the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case of 
U.S. v. Pink and its progeny “for the proposition that an official statement or 
declaration from a foreign government clarifying its laws must be accepted 
as ‘conclusive.’”74 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, which was 
accepted by the district court, “that Rule 44.1, adopted in 1966 long 
after Pink was decided, modified the level of deference that a U.S. court must 
extend to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws.”75 
Finally, the Second Circuit noted that MOFCOM’s amicus filings 
before both the district and circuit courts were “historic” because “it is the 
first time any entity of the Chinese government has appeared amicus curiae 
before any U.S. court.”76 Moreover, the Second Circuit noted that: 
[T]he Chinese Government has repeatedly made known to the federal 
courts . . . [and] the United States Department of State . . . that it considers 
the lack of deference it received in our courts, and the exercise of 
jurisdiction over this suit, to be disrespectful and that it “has attached great 
importance to this case.”77 
Clearly, MOFCOM’s decision to participate directly in the litigation 
and present its position on the proper interpretation of Chinese law was 
pivotal to the outcome. In fact, the Second Circuit commented in a footnote 
that “if the Chinese government had not appeared in this litigation,” the 
district court’s decision to engage in a wide ranging analysis of Chinese law 
“would have been entirely appropriate.”78 And in another footnote, the 
Second Circuit cautioned that “deference may be inappropriate” where 
“there is no documentary evidence or reference of law proffered to support 
a foreign sovereign’s interpretation of its own laws.”79 
The decision suggests—in the Second Circuit at least—that a high 
degree of deference must be accorded when a foreign government appears 
directly in a U.S. court and provides a reasonably detailed explanation of its 
own nation’s laws or regulations. Of course, what a reasonably detailed 
explanation by a foreign sovereign must look like to be accorded deference 
is an open question. Another question left unanswered by the decision, 
however, is what level of deference will be accorded to such official 
statements when they are proffered by a private defendant in a subsequent 
 
 73.  Id. at 182–83. 
 74.  Id. at 186–87. 
 75.  Id. at 187. 
 76.  Id. at 180 n.5.  
 77.  Id. at 193–94. 
 78.  Id. at 191 n.10. 
 79.  Id. at 189 n.8. 
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action in which the foreign government does not directly participate. Should 
private parties be permitted to step in the shoes of the foreign government to 
raise that government’s regulatory interests? If so, what level of deference is 
due in these cases? 
Besides its relevance for international comity analysis, this case also 
highlights the fact that many “big conflicts” cases will implicate state 
interests to a greater degree than standard “little conflicts” cases. Most 
notably, states themselves may have important regulatory policies in play. 
Either because the state is a litigant or because the litigation of private claims 
implicates important state regulatory interests, there is the increasing 
potential for “big conflicts.” This conflict does not seem susceptible to the 
standard focus/priority analysis offered by the new Conflicts Restatement, 
but perhaps it should be considered by the drafters. 
CONCLUSION 
The new Conflicts Restatement presents the opportunity for a 
reconsideration of the conflict-of-laws method in international conflicts. As 
part of this process, the drafters should not only consider transnational cases 
but also the ways in which federal and state presumptions against 
extraterritoriality illuminate the scope and priority approach proffered by the 
new Conflicts Restatement. An opportunity is also present for the new 
Conflicts Restatement to focus on conflicts cases of great significance, such 
as cross-border regulatory cases involving foreign sovereigns. In reviewing 
such cases, the drafters may benefit from careful study of the international 
comity doctrine as well as the submissions of foreign sovereigns before U.S. 
courts. At a minimum, some sensitivity and recognition by the drafters that 
different types of conflicts may counsel in favor of different conflicts rules 
is in order. 
 
